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LABOR LAW 
AIRLINE MERGER AND THE IMPACT OF A 
MINORITY UNION'S LABOR CONTRACT: 
THE DELTA-WESTERN AIR LINES 
MERGER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At 5:00 PM on March 31, 1987 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in IBTCWHA, Local Union No. 2707 v. Western Air 
Lines, Inc., l enjoined the merger of Delta Airlines and Western 
Air Lines which was scheduled for the following day. The in-
junction was to remain in place pending a decision in arbitration 
between Western and one of its labor unions.2 Western Air Lines 
immediately petitioned U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor to stay the Ninth Circuit injunction.3 In a harshly 
worded decision, Justice O'Connor stayed the Ninth Circuit 
Court's injunction. Her ruling supports the principle that labor 
contracts of a constituent corporation that is covered by the 
Railway Labor Act (RLA) die with the birth of the merger.4 
II. FACTS 
From late 1985 through 1986 there were twenty-five airline 
mergers!) that changed the makeup of the airline industry.6 The 
1. 813 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1987)(per curiam; the panel members were Goodwin, J., 
Schroeder, J., and Poole, J.), petition for cert. filed April 1, 1987, injunction stayed, 107 
S.Ct. 1515 (1987) (O'Connor, J., in chanIbers) (hereinafter Western). 
2. Id. at 1364. 
3. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 107 S.Ct. 
1515 (1987) (decision on application for stay)(O'Connor, J., in chanIbers) (hereinafter 
Western II). 
4.Id. 
5. L.A. Times, Jan. 26, 1987, § IV, at 13, col. 3. 
195 
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top five airlines increased their market share from 55% in 1985 
to 73% in 1987.7 These mergers in the highly unionized airline 
industrys had an adverse impact on employees and their unions.s 
In the last twenty-five years, four of the five top airlines have 
litigated labor cases before the United States Courts of Appeals 
arising out of mergers. These cases created the major body of 
law involving representation rights of unions following a 
merger.IO 
A. THE GRIEVANCES AT WESTERN 
In the present case, the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters (Teamsters) represented three separate "classes or crafts"ll 
6. This rash of mergers in the airline industry have occurred following the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). See Comment, De-
regulation in the Airline Industry: Toward A New Judicial Interpretation of the 
Railway Labor Act, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1003 (1986). The article suggests that the Airline 
Deregulation Act has led to new strategies, including mergers with non-union airlines, 
the creation of non-union subsidiaries, permanent layoffs of employees, Chapter 11 
bankruptcies and disavowal of collective bargaining agreements in the airline industries. 
Id. at 1009. The author suggests that case law indicates new legislative protections are 
necessary to correct a management bias favoring the financial health of the airlines to 
the detriment of organized labor. Id. at 1004, 1035. See also LEVINE AND LEVENGOOD, 
Productivity and Wage Concessions: Current Bargaining Issues for U.S. Airlines, 9 
EMF. REL. L.J. 308 (1982). 
7. Travel Weekly, Feb. 2, 1987, Vol. 46, No.9, at 18, col. 3. The top five airlines were 
Texas Air, United, American, Delta and Northwest. Id. The top ten airlines controlled 
96% of the market. Id. 
8. LEVINE AND LEVENGOOD, Productivity and Wage Concessions: Current Bargaining 
Issues for U.S. Airlines, 9 EMF. REL. L.J. 308 (1982) (hereinafter LEVINE & LEVENGOOD). 
The authors give a curtailed history of the comfortable relationship between manage-
ment and organized labor prior to deregulation. Id. at 312-15. The authors suggest that 
the Airline Deregulation Act, high energy costs, inflation, low-cost competition, the air 
traffic controllers' strike and the economic recession have resulted in financial losses 
which have occasioned a new management strategy in labor negotiations which includes 
cost cutting and wage concessions. Id. at 309. 
9. Travel Weekly, Feb. 2, 1987, Vol. 46, No.9, at 18, coL 3. The author, Michael 
Derchin, an airline analyst, states that the toughest job in mergers is the meshing of 
labor forces. Id. at 18. 
10. See infra note 59 (United merger with Capital Airlines), notes 67, 81 (Northeast 
merger with Delta), note 88 (Continental merger with Texas International), and note 99 
(Northwest merger with Republic). 
11. T.KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 50.04 at 50-11 to 50-21 (rev. ed. 1984). The Railway La-
bor Act at 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth, states that "the majority of any craft or class of 
employees shall have the right to determine who shall be representative of the craft or 
class .... " The craft or class extends to all of the employees in that class or craft on a 
company-wide or system-wide basis. Id. at 50-12. Most employees fall within one of the 
generally recognized crafts or classes which h8ve evolved. Id. at 50-15. These include 
pilots, flight engineers, flight attendants, dispatchers, mechanics and related employees, 
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of employees at Western Air Lines (Western).12 The Teamster 
labor contract with Western contained a provision that prohib-
ited Western's agreement to a corporate merger unless certain 
conditions were met. IS Similar understandings were incorporated 
in Western's agreements with the Airline Transport Employees 
(ATE), whose appeal was consolidated with the Teamster case.14 
Delta acquired all of Western's stock shortly after the 
merger was approved by shareholders on December 16, 1986.15 
From December until April, Western was to operate as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Delta16 with the legal and operational 
stock clerks, office clerical employees, passenger service employees and fleet service em-
ployees. Id. at 50-IS, n.23. 
12. Western, 813 F.2d at 1360. The Teamsters were certified for three crafts or clas-
ses employed by Western: mechanics and related employees, stock clerks, and flight in-
structors. Id. 
13. Id. at 1361. The conditions obligated Western to obtain the acquiring corpora-
tion's agreement that Western's maintenance facilities would be operated separately 
post-merger, that post-merger work performed by Western's employees would be recog-
nized as being within Teamster work jurisdiction, and that the post-merger work and 
employees would be covered by the existing collective bargaining agreements. Id. The 
merger provisions in the labor contracts were part of extensive negotiations in 1984 that 
included wage concessions by employees exceeding ten percent. [d. The earlier wage con-
cessions had aided Western's financial recovery and both Delta and Western were finan-
cially viable prior to the merger. See L.A. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § IV, at I, col. 3. The 
article states that Delta has never experienced a work stoppage. [d. at 2. During the 
economically difficult times following deregulation, Delta gave its employees wage in-
creases while other airlines were laying off employees. The article stated that Delta was 
rated number ten in the book The 100 Best Companies to Work for in America. [d. The 
average pay of a Delta employee was $51,200 per year and the average pay of a Western 
employee was $36,500 per year. [d. Because of this, employee turnover at Delta was an 
extremely low three-tenths of one percent. Id. at 5. Western was also financially viable, 
recovering from the brink of bankruptcy a few years earlier. [d. at 1. Western merged 
because they "did not have the economic or technical wherewithal to succeed." [d. For 
example, the airline needed a computerized reservation system and a 300 airplane fleet, 
which it could not afford. [d. See also LEVINE AND LEVENGOOD, supra, note 8, at I, where 
the authors state that in 1981 only four of the top twelve airlines reported profits: Delta, 
Northwest, American and U.S. Air. 
14. Western, 813 F.2d at 1361. ATE was the representative of Western's clerical, 
office, fleet, and passenger service employees. 
15. Western II, 107 S.Ct. 1515 (1987). See also L.A. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § IV, at I, 
col. 3. The merger produced a surviving corporation worth 900 million dollars with 
48,000 employees and over 360 jets. Id. at 2. Revenue increases are anticipated to reach 
1.5 billion dollars in the 1987 calendar year. [d. at 1. 
16. Brief for Defendants/Appellees at 3, IBTCWHA, Local Union No. 2707 v. West-
ern Air Lines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1987)(per curiam; the panel members were 
Goodwin, J., Schroeder, J., and Poole, J.), petition for cert. filed April 1, 1987, injunc-
tion stayed, 107 S.Ct. 1515 (1987) (O'Connor, J., in chambers). 
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merger scheduled for April 1, 1987.17 Thereafter Western would 
cease to exist. IS The merger agreement did not provide that 
Delta would be bound by the conditions of Western's labor con-
tracts.19 The omission probably resulted from the fact that Delta 
was non-union and had approximately three times as many em-
ployees doing the same kind of work as the "classes or crafts"20 
represented by the Teamsters at Western. 21 
The unions filed grievances22 which alleged that the labor 
contracts with Western were breached by Western's uncondi-
tioned agreement to merge.23 Western refused to arbitrate the 
grievances24 and argued that the issue involved the union's rep-
resentational status in the post-merger operation and thus was 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation 
Board (NMB).2G 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
The Teamsters brought the initial action against Western in 
district court to compel arbitration of the grievances.26 The dis-
trict court dismissed the Union's complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and held that the issues involved employee 
representation matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
NMB.27 The Ninth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the Team-
sters that the issues were subject to arbitration and enjoined the 
merger. On the same day Western filed a Writ of Certiorari 
17. [d. 
18. [d. 
19. Western, 813 F.2d at 1361. 
20. Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 662 F. 
Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1987) aff'd, Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Western 
Air Lines, Inc., slip op. No. 87-7040 (D.C. Cir. March 31, 1987). This case involves the 
same merger as Western with a similar issue, but with a different labor union. 
21. Brief for Defendants/Appellees at 3, mTCWHA, Local Union No. 2707 v. West-
ern Air Lines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1987)(per curiam; the panel members were 
Goodwin, J., Schroeder, J., and Poole, J.), petition for cert. filed April 1, 1987, injunc-
tion stayed, 107 S.Ct. 1515 (1987) (O'Connor, J., in chambers). 
22. Western, 813 F.2d at 1361. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. The issue between the parties in the line of cases presented in this article 
revolves around which forum has jurisdiction, the federal courts or the National Media-
tion Board. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
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before the U.S. Supreme Court. On April 2, 1987, Associate Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor granted a stay of the Ninth Circuit 
injunction.28 
III. BACKGROUND 
The Railway Labor Act (RLA)29 was originally enacted in 
1926, almost a decade before the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).30 These first federal efforts were directed toward the 
systems that were the primary carriers of goods and passengers 
in interstate commerce. The RLA of 1926 was an agreement 
worked out between management and labor31 converted into leg-
islation, and then ratified by the Congress and the President.32 
The RLA, as originally enacted, set forth the rights and duties 
of carriers and their employees, including the employees' right 
to organize into unions and bargain with their employers.33 The 
28. Western II, 107 S.Ct. 1515 (1987). 
29. The Railway Labor Act is codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1936). 
30. The National Labor Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1947). 
31. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, (1944), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 
661 (1946) (contains a clear legislative history of the RLA and is a good starting point for 
a complete analysis of the Act). 
32. Id. 
33. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1934), Ninth states in part: 
If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to 
who are the representatives of such employees designated and 
authorized in accordance with the requirements of this chap-
ter, it shall be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request 
of either party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute and 
to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after 
the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or names 
of the individuals or organizations that have been designated 
and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dis-
pute, and certify the same to the carrier. Upon receipt of such 
certification the carrier shall treat with the representative so 
certified as the representative of the craft or class for the pur-
poses of this chapter. In such an investigation, the Mediation 
Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the em-
ployees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of 
ascertaining the names of their duly designated and author-
ized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice 
of representatives by the employees without interference, in-
fluence, or coercion excercised by the carrier. In the conduct of 
any election for the purposes herein indicated the Board shall 
designate who may participate in the election and establish 
the rules to govern the election, or may appoint a committee 
of three neutral persons who after hearing shall within ten 
days designate the employees who may participate in the elec-
5
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Act created procedures and federal administrative machinery to 
facilitate the selection of bargaining representatives and the 
reaching of agreements. S4 
The intent of the RLA was the peaceful settlement of labor 
disputes.s !> To that end, the RLA provides procedural machinery 
for the settlement of three classes of labor disputes: (1) major 
disputes (2) representation disputes and (3) minor disputes.s6 
A. "MAJOR DISPUTES" 
"Major" disputes involve disagreements over the formation 
of collective bargaining agreements. S7 The negotiation of agree-
ments follows a long and drawn out procedure.ss If negotiations 
fail, the NMB will mediate. S9 If mediation fails, the President of 
the United States has the power to halt any economic action by 
the Union for a "cooling off period."40 The federal courts are, by 
implication, authorized to issue injunctions maintaining the sta-
tus quo pending the exhaustion of these procedures.41 Following 
the exhaustion of the procedures the parties are free to resort to 
self-help: the union may strike and the carrier may unilaterally 
change the terms and conditions of employment.42 
tion. The Board shall have access to and have power to make 
copies of the books and records of the carriers to obtain and 
utilize such information as may be deemed necessary by it to 
carry out the purposes and provisions of this paragraph. 
, 34. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1934). 
35. Elgin, 325 U.S. 711. 
36. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1934). See also Elgin, 325 U.S. 711 (1944). The terms "ma-
jor" and "minor" do not appear in the statute. Elgin used these classifications in the text 
of the decision. Id. at 723. Elgin recognized the classifications as terms that had been 
traditional in the railway labor world. Id. The terms "major" and "minor" have been 
used consistently in subsequent decisions. Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Indus-
try: Toward, A New Judicial Interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, 80 Nw. UL. REV. 
1003, 1005 n.20 (1986). The Comment reviews the history of the RLA and suggests that 
courts institute labor-protective standards to insure against deregulation's erosion of la-
bor's bargaining power. 
37. Elgin, 325 U.S. 711 at 723. 
38. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1934). 
39. Id. 
40. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 717 F.2d 
157 (5th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter Texas Int'/). See also note 92 and accompanying text. 
41. Western, 813 F.2d 1359 at 1363, citing Federal Express Corp. v. Teamsters 
Union, 617 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1980). 
42. Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d at 159. 
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B. "REPRESENTATION DISPUTES" 
"Representation" disputes are governed by 45 U.S.C. sec-
tion 152, Ninth,43 which provides that it is the duty of the Na-
tional Mediation Board (NMB) to investigate any dispute con-
cerning the identity of the collective bargaining representative of 
employees and then to certify the organization which has been 
properly designated as the exclusive employee representative.44 
All issues concerning the proper representative of employees 
of a carrier are resolved by the NMB.41> The Supreme Court has 
held that the NMB has exclusive jurisdiction over representa-
tion issues and its determinations are not reviewable by state or 
federal courts.46 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ruby v. 
American Airlines, Inc.,47 held that as soon as the action reveals 
a representation dispute, the court is required to dismiss the 
complaint!8 The Second Circuit ruled in Summit Airlines v 
Teamsters, Local Union No. 295,49 that a union could not use 
43. See supra note 33, where pertinent portions are quoted. 
44. 45 u.s.c. § 152, Ninth (1934). 
45.ld. 
46. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943). The Broth-
erhood of Railroad Trainmen and the Switchmen's Union filed with the NMB to be 
designated the representative of the class or craft of "yardmen" of the New York Central 
and Michigan Central Railroads. ld. at 299. The Brotherhood sought to be the represen-
tative for all the yardmen of the rail lines operated by the New York Central System. ld. 
The Switchmen contended that yardmen of certain designated parts of the system 
should be permitted to vote for separate representatives instead of being compelled to 
take part in a system-wide election. ld. The NMB designated all yardmen of the carriers 
as participants in the election. ld. The Brotherhood was certified after the election and 
the suit for cancellation of the certification was brought in the district court by the 
Switchmen. ld. The U.S. Supreme Court never reached the merits of the dispute; instead 
it ruled that the district court did not have the power to review the action of the Na-
tional Mediation Board in issuing the certificate. ld. at 300. The Court stated the dispute 
was to reach its termination when the administrative finding was made. "There was to be 
no dragging out of the controversy into other tribunals." ld. at 305. The Court explained: 
"Where Congress took such great pains to protect the Mediation Board in its handling of 
an explosive problem, we cannot help but believe that if Congress had desired to impli-
cate the federal judiciary and to place on the federal courts the burden of having the 
final say on any aspect of the problem, it would have made its desire plain." ld. at 303. 
47. 323 F.2d 248, 256 (2nd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 913 (1964). The court 
dismissed the motion of the union to compel the employer to bargain since another 
union also claimed to represent the same group of employees. ld. 
48.ld. 
49. 628 F.2d 787 (2nd Cir. 1980). The Teamsters picketed the employer at JFK Air-
port, attempting to force the employer to recognize them as the representative for cargo-
handlers without a representation election conducted by the NMB. ld. at 789. The court 
7
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economic coercion to circumvent the NMB.M Thus, a union can 
be enjoined' from representing employees when accomplished 
through economic coercion such as picketing. Gl 
C. "MINOR DISPUTES" 
By 1934, turmoil appeared in disputes between carriers and 
their unions over the interpretation and enforcement of existing 
contracts.G2 Problems developed when varying interpretations of 
the provisions in a labor contract concerning wages, hours and 
working conditions were so polarized that they led to strikes, 
lockouts, and other disruptions of a magnitude equaling those 
resulting from failure to reach agreements in contract 
negotiations. G3 
Congress, in the amended Act of 1934, adopted a different 
device to resolve such disputes expeditiously.G4 Parties were en-
couraged to set up one or more industry "adjustment boards" to 
hear and determine labor disputes over intepretation of contract 
terms.GG Arbitration of unresolved disputes was encouraged. Un-
. resolved disputes were to be referred to the newly created Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board that had the power to make a 
binding award, subject to review and enforcement by the 
courts.G6 
In 1936 the RLA was made applicable to the airline indus-
try G7 and a similar "Systems Adjustment Board" procedure was 
adopted.GS The disputes handled by the National Railroad Ad-
justment Board or the Systems Adjustment Board were labled 
enjoined the picketing as a violation of the RLA. Id. at 795. 
50. Id. at 789. 
51. Id. 
52. Elgin, 325 U.S. 711 at 726. 
53. Id. at 726 n.22. 
54. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1934) contains a lengthy dispute resolution procedure for the 
disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing 
out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning 
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1936) applies all the provisions of the Act (with certain excep-
tions not involved here) to "every common carrier by air * * * and * * * person who 
performs any work as an employee * * * of such carrier." [d. 
58. 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1936). 
8
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"minor." 
Federal courts have the power to issue injunctions where 
there are labor disputes concerning issues that are properly 
before the Systems Adjustment Board.69 Each court balances 
competing claims of irreparable hardship, the traditional func-
tion of a court of equity.6o The exercise of this power is review-
able only for abuse of discretion.61 
Since the procedures for each type of dispute are different, 
when a dispute arises between a carrier and its employee repre-
sentative, it is imperative to define at the outset whether it is a 
major, minor or representation dispute. 
IV. A HISTORY OF AIRLINE MERGERS THROUGH 
COURT DECISIONS 
The continuing merger of airlines has led to questions con-
cerning the identity of an employee representative after a 
merger where at least one of the constituent corporations has 
employees represented by a labor union. A major problem has 
been placing the issues arising out of a merger under the proper 
procedure. The line of cases over the last twenty years leading to 
the Ninth Circuit decision in Western has narrowed and clari-
fied decisional law on the issue. 
A. THE MERGER OF CAPITAL AIRLINES AND UNITED AmLINES, 
1963.62 
Capital Airlines, Inc. (Capital) was party to a labor contract 
59. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R., 363 U.S. 528 (1960). 
The Supreme Court upheld the district court's injunction order to end a strike over a 
"minor" dispute pending a decision by the Adjustment Board. Id. at 530. The district 
court did so upon certain conditions that were the subject of the controversy before the 
court. Id. These conditions required that the Railroads either (1) restore the situation 
which existed prior to the General Orders, or (2) pay the employees adversely affected by 
the orders the wages they would have received had the orders not been issued. Id. The 
conditions imposed on the employer by the court were the price of injunction sought by 
the employer. Id. at 535. 
60. See Note, Developments In The Law - Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1005-8 
(1965). 
61. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 363 U.S. at 535. 
62. "Brotherhood ofRy. and Steamship Clerks v. United Air Lines, Inc., 325 F.2d 576 
9
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with the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight 
Handlers, Express and Station Employees (Clerks).63 The labor 
contract provided that Capital would negotiate labor protective 
devices in the event of merger.64 Capital was merged into United 
Airlines, Inc. (United). The Clerks sought a declaration that 
United was bound by the terms of Capital's labor contract.6!> 
The Clerks were attempting to place the issue within the juris-
diction of the Systems Adjustment Board by claiming that the 
dispute was between the exclusive union representative of Capi-
tal employees and United Airlines.66 The district court stated 
that in spite of the artful pleading, the underlying dispute con-
cerned representation and held that it lacked jurisdiction.67 
Three prior decisions of the Supreme Court in the railroad in-
dustry made it clear that the federal courts have no jurisdiction 
over the resolution of representation disputes under the RLA.68 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
dismissal.69 
(6th Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 26 (1964). 
63. [d. at 577. 
64. [d. The court's opinion quoted Article 1(b) of the collective bargaining agree-
ment between Capital and the Clerks which provided: 
All provisions of this agreement shall be binding upon the suc-
cessors or assigns of the Company (i.e. Capital) and in case of 
a consolidation or merger, the Company (i.e. Capital) will no-
tify the Brotherhood at least 90 days prior to such consolida-
tion, or merger, and representatives of the Company (i.e. Capi-
tal) and the Brotherhood will meet and negotiate for the 
procedure to be followed and the protection to be afforded the 
employees involved. 
65. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 325 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1963). 
66. [d. United had three times the employees of Capital and probably reasoned that 
they could not win representation rights before the NMB with the support of only 30% 
of the employees. [d. at 578. It seems that by skillful pleading and by framing the issue 
as a contract violation the union was trying to invoke the "minor" disputes procedures 
and bring the issue before an arbitrator. The Clerks must have had the idea the National 
Mediation Board would not certify them since they could not show that they represented 
a majority of the employees in the craft or class. The Clerks had a better chance of post 
merger survival by either arguing a contract adoption theory before an impartial arbitra-
tor, or gaining "status" or "recognition" if it could force United to talk with them in 
some manner as a representative of employee interests. 
67. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 325 F.2d at 579-80 (6th Cir. 1963). 
68. [d. at 578, citing Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 
(1943); General Comm. v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943); General Comm. v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 320 U.S. 338 (1943). 
69. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 325 F.2d at 580 (6th Cir. 1963). 
10
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B. THE MERGER OF NORTHEAST AIRLINES AND DELTA AIRLINES, 
1972.'10 
Northeast Airlines, Inc., party to a labor contract with the 
International Association of Machinists (lAM),'1l agreed to a 
merger with Delta Air Lines, Inc.'12 The lAM proposed in negoti-
ations for a contract to succeed the recently expired labor con-
tract several "post-merger protective devices" for union mem-
bers.'13 Northeast refused to consider them.'14 The lAM sought an 
injunction to the merger and an order compelling Northeast to 
negotiate on the post-merger seniority and employment rights of 
Northeast employees.'15 
The court reasoned that the decision to merge was at the 
core of entrepreneurial controF6 and held that Northeast was 
not required to consult or negotiate with the lAM concerning 
that class of decision, or the merger's impact on employees.'1'1 
Further, the post-merger entity would be a different legal entity 
entitled to make its own management decisions over which 
Northeast had no controPS The First Circuit noted that the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) had jurisdiction over post-
merger protective devices for employees,'19 and it was not in the 
public interest to have mergers approved by the CAB, only to be 
obstructed by labor disputes.so 
70. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, 
Inc., 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972) (hereinafter lAM v. 
Northeast). 
71. ld. at 551. The labor contract expired December 31, 1971, and the merger was 
scheduled for June 12, 1972. ld. at 552. 
72. lAM v. Northeast, 473 F.2d 549, 552. 
73.ld. 
74.ld. 
75.ld. 
76. ld. at 557, citing Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
77. lAM v. Northeast, 473 F.2d at 560 (1st Cir. 1972). The court stated: "We con-
clude, therefore, that NE cannot be required to bargain about the protection to be ac-
corded its employees in the event of particular postmerger operating changes to be man-
dated by the CAB or to be made by Delta, nor about the employment rights of NE 
employees vis-a-vis Delta employees." ld. 
78. ld. at 558. , 
79. ld. at 559, citing 49 USC § 1378 (1938). 
80. lAM v. Northeast, 473 F.2d at 559 (1st Cir. 1972). The court stated: "One of the 
policies behind this grant of authority to the CAB is to prevent mergers adjudged by the 
Board to be in the public interest from being obstructed by labor disputes." ld. 
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The First Circuit also applied a balancing of hardship anal-
ysis, noting that a court of equity was obliged to choose the 
course likely to cause the least injury.81 Granting an injunction 
threatened damage to Northeast out of proportion to the poten-
tial damage faced by the lAM.82 Therefore, the First Circuit af-
firmed the district court's denial of relief in the context of a 
"major dispute. "83 
C. THE MERGER OF NORTHEAST AIRLINES AND DELTA AIRLINES, 
REVISITED, 1976.84 
Having lost the right to negotiate post-merger conditions at 
Northeast prior to the merger with Delta, the lAM attempted to 
police the administration of CAB labor protective devices and 
any post-merger rights it might have at Delta Airlines.85 The 
JAM demanded that Delta bargain with the JAM over these is-
sues.88 Delta refused. 
The First Circuit ruled that the CAB had exclusive author-
ity to control the application of its mandated labor protective 
devices.8'1 Thus, the district court had no jurisdiction.88 
The court held there was no duty on the part of Delta to 
talk to the lAM concerning any other post-merger issues not re-
lated to holdover grievances or the survival of any Northeast 
81. Id. at 553. 
82. Id. at 544. The CAB had consistently applied a package of labor protective de-
vices as a condition for approval of mergers since 1961. Id. Also, post-merger labor con-
tract conditions may operate to the detriment of Delta's employees since they had no 
opportunity to participate in the negotiations. Id. at 559. The court concluded that the 
employees would fare far better if the merger went through without the desired negotia-
tions. Id. at 554. The district court rested its decision upon a finding that the right of 
Northeast's management to decide the company's future outweigh whatever interest the 
union had in protecting its members. Id. at 552. 
83. Id. at 555. 
84. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, 
Inc., 536 F.2d 975 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976) (hereinafter lAM v. 
Northeast II). 
85. It seems the lAM was attempting to create "status" by forcing Delta to talk to 
them even though the lAM represented only a minority of the employees of the merged 
entity. It was a backdoor attempt to be "recogni2ed" as a legitimate representative with-
out going through the procedures for certification under the Act. 
86. lAM v. Northeast II, 536 F.2d at 976. 
87. Id. at 977. 
88.Id. 
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contract rights.s9 It concluded that, absent certification in the 
merged unit, the post-merger entity did not have to negotiate 
with a union of a constituent corporation.90 
D. THE MERGER OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES AND TEXAS INTERNA-
TIONAL, 1983.91 
The issues in this case arose out of the merger of Texas In-
ternational (TXI) and Continental Airlines.92 Continental had 
approximately twice the number of employees in the class or 
craft of employees represented by the Teamsters at TXI.93 Mter 
the merger, the former TXI employees worked under the Conti-
nental employment policies without substantial employee 
hardships.94 
89. Id. at 979. Surviving rights from the contract between the lAM and Northeast 
were treated differently. Id. The court stated there were no pending grievances at North-
east that the lAM was seeking to remedy through Delta, nor had Delta refused to 
submit to a System Adjustment Board (SAB) resolution of particular disputes concern-
ing the survival of rights under the Northeast collective bargaining agreement. Id. 
90. lAM v. Northeast II, 536 F.2d at 978. The court said: 
At the very least, the merger created real doubts about 
whether plaintiffs represent the majority of any Delta craft or 
class of employees, and where there is such doubt, federal 
courts leave resolution of the dispute to the National Media-
tion Board. (footnotes omitted) In the absence of National 
Mediation Board certification, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth, there is 
no basis for finding a duty on the part of Delta to negotiate 
with plaintiffs. 
Id. The First Circuit thereby joined with the Sixth Circuit's earlier decision. See supra 
note 59. 
91. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 717 F.2d 
157 (5th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter Texas Int'l). 
92. Id. at 160. Through a series of stock acquisitions and corporation reorganiza-
tions, Texas Air Corporation acquired control of Continental Air Corporation which in 
turn acquired all of the stock of two airlines, Texas Int'l (TXI) and Continental Airlines 
(Continental). Id. 
93. Id. TXI had over 3,000 employees with approximately 1,800 represented by the 
Teamsters. Id. Continental had over 10,000 employees of whom 4,000 were non-union in 
the same crafts that were represented by the Teamsters at TXI. Id. The labor contract 
between TXI and the Teamsters expired January 31, 1983. Id. 
94. Id. at 160. Sixty-eight of the 1,800 employees of TXI were adversely affected by 
the -merger. Id. Each was offerred employment after relocation, but declined. Id. at 160. 
The court stated: 
As a condition of its approval, the CAB required TXI to agree 
to labor protective provisions. These provisions require TXI to 
pay a displacement allowance to all employees placed in lower 
paying jobs as a result of the merger, a dismissal allowance to 
employees whose jobs were eliminated, moving expenses to 
13
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The Teamsters sought a declaratory judgment that its con-
tract remained valid despite its minority status.95 Although os-
tensibly a contract enforcement action, the underlying issue was 
the identity of the representative of the former TXI employees 
after the merger.96 The court ruled that it may not grant injunc-
tive relief if the underlying dispute is representational in nature, 
even if the dispute arose in the context of an otherwise justicia-
ble claim.97 
The Fifth Circuit noted that a judgment for the union 
would require that Continental employees be represented by a 
minority union.98 The court held that so long as the operating 
unit is not dramatically altered by a merger so that the union's 
majority status was not destroyed, the company must adhere to 
its labor agreements.99 However, where the employee group that 
had previously been represented by the union becomes a minor-
ity craft in the merged corporation, the majority is destroyed, 
and the question of employee representation arises.loo When this 
happens, resolution of that question is the function of the 
NMB.IOI 
In other words, the Fifth Circuit held that when a merger 
employees required to relocate, and to integrate seniority lists 
in a 'fair and equitable manner.' They require also that arbi-
tration be available at the instance of any employee or group 
of employees to resolve any dispute relating to seniority inte-
gration or any other dispute about the application of the labor 
protective provisions. 
Id. The merged company harbored no union animosity and voluntarily recognized unions 
where classes or crafts of employees at TXI and Continental were represented by the 
same union. Id. See also infra note 151. 
95. Id. at 160. 
96. Id. at 161. 
97. Id. The pleadings for contract enforcement were justiciable claims similar to 
those in Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks. See supra note 52, and accompany-
ing text. 
98. Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d 157. The court stated that if the Teamsters were to re-
present the former TXI employees as they requested, then "One clerk would have a 
union representative; two of his neighbors would be unrepresented. One employee's 
working conditions and grievance procedures would be governed by a collective bargain-
ing agreement; two of his neighbors would not." Id. at 163. The court referred to the 
NMB rule that, upon a merger of two airlines, "all certifications ... were extinguished 
by operation of law." Id. Not to do so would lead to "uneven representation, duplication 
of effort, and confusion." Id. 
99. Id. at 164. 
100.,Id. 
101. [d. The Fifth Circuit thus joined the Sixth Circuit. 
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takes place and a constituent corporation dies, the constituent's 
obligations to its workers, and its contracts with its labor unions 
may also die.102 
E. THE MERGER OF NORTHWEST AIRLINES AND REPUBLIC AIR-
LINES, 1986.103 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Northwest) and Republic Airlines, 
Inc., (Republic) were scheduled to merge, with Northwest be-
coming the survivor. 1M Northwest had 6435 ground employees 
represented by the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks 
(BRAC) and the International Association of Machinists (IAM). 
Republic, on the other hand, had 6624 ground employees repre-
sented by the Air Line Employees Association, International 
(ALEA).lOI1 In anticipation of the merger, Northwest entered 
into a "transition" agreement with their own unions, BRAC and 
the lAM, to voluntarily recognize them exclusively as the repre-
sentatives of ground employees in the post-merger entity. lOS 
The ALEA moved to preserve the status quo pending (1) 
the outcome of a National Mediation Board representation pro-
ceeding and (2) the arbitration of a grievance with Republic.107 
The district court dismissed the action without a hearing, hold-
ing that the complaint was a representation dispute over which 
the federal courts do not have jurisdiction. lOB 
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court's decision 
as it was in conformity with the overwhelming and well devel-
102. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 325 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1963). 
103. Air Line Employees Ass'n., Int'l. v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 798 F.2d 967 (7th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 458 (1986)(hereinafter Republic). 
104.Id. 
105.Id. 
106. Id. Republic had followed a similar course of action in its 1980 merger with 
Hughes Airwest Airlines. See Association of Flight Attendants v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 
534 F. Supp. 783 (D. Minn. 1982). The Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) was a 
party to labor contracts at Republic and at Hughes. Id. at 784. Republic, the surviving 
corporation, had entered into a "fence" agreement with AFA wherein Republic volunta-
rily recognized the union for the merged corporation. Id. In this case the district court 
balanced the equities and ruled against a requested injunction. Id. at 790. 
107. Republic, 798 F.2d at 967. 
108. AEA v. Republic, No. 86 C 5239 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1986) (order dismissing). 
This unpublished decision was cited by the court at 798 F.2d 968. 
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oped case law in other circuits.lo9 The court held that even 
though the complaint was couched in terms of enforcing the la-
bor contract, the dispute concerned representation.110 
F. THE MERGER OF DELTA AIRLINES AND WESTERN As VIEWED 
By THE D.C. COURT OF ,ApPEALS, 1987.11l 
The Association of Flight Attendants (AF A) was a party to 
a labor contract with Western Air Lines.ll2 Section l(c) of the 
labor contract required Western to bind any successor to that 
contract.11S 
The AF A sought an order from the district court directing 
Western to submit the issue to the Systems Adjustment Board 
(SAB) and asked the court to retain jurisdiction to enforce com-
pliance with any award the SAB made against Western.lH The 
AF A requested the court to preserve the status quo by prevent-
ing the merger pending completion of proceedings before the 
SAB.111S 
The district court held that the issue of post-merger repre-
sentation was presented in the dispute,116 and any attempt to 
divide jurisdiction between the SAB and the NMB would defeat 
the purposes of the RLA,117 The complaint was dismissed with 
prejudice by the district court.11S The Court of Appeals for the 
109. Republic, 798 F.2d at 968. The same observation of the "overwhelming and 
well-developed case law" is quoted by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. See Western II, 
107 S.Ct. at 1517. 
110. Republic, 798 F.2d at 968. 
111. Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 662 F. 
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Western Air 
Lines, Inc., slip op. No. 87-7040 (D.C. Cir. March 31, 1987). 
112. ld. at 2. 
113.ld. 
114.ld. 
115. ld. The Association of Flight Attendants took a position parallel to the Team-
sters in Western. The dismissal by the district court and the dismissal on appeal, how-
ever, did not seem to influence the Ninth Circuit. 
116. Ass'n of Flight Attendants, 662 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1987). 
117. ld. at n.7, citing Texas lnt'l, 717 F.2d at 164. The court in Texas lnt'l stated, 
"Given the [National] Mediation Board's undeniable sole jurisdiction over representa-
tion matters, we infer from the practical problems of divided jurisdiction a congressional 
intention to allow that agency alone to consider the post-merger problems that arise 
from existing collective bargaining agreements." Texas lnt'l, 717 F.2d at 164. 
118. Ass'n of Flight Attendants, 662 F. Supp. at 4 (D.D.C. 1987). 
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District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.1l9 
V. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Western, the district court had dismissed the Teamster 
action as a representation issue within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the NMB.120 The Teamsters sought to enjoin the merger, 
claiming that the issue involved a "minor" dispute over contract 
interpretation.121 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Teamsters 
and reversed the district court, holding that the dispute was 
"minor. "122 
The Ninth Circuit stated that the constituent or target cor-
poration, Western, was still in existence.123 Therefore, there was 
no representation question at Western since the union already 
represented Western employees.124 The dispute was between ex-
isting parties over the application and interpretation of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between them and subject to court ju-
risdiction as a "minor" dispute.125 The court distinguished the 
precedents cited by Western as "post-merger" disputes whereas 
this case was "pre-merger. "126 
In halting the transfer, the Ninth Circuit cited the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Local Lodge No 1266, International Associ-
ation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Pano-
ramic Corporation,127 as "more instructive."l28 In that case, the 
119. Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Western Air Lines, Inc., slip op. 
No. 87-7040 (D.C. Cir. March 31,1987). 
120. IBTCWHA, Local Union No. 2707 v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1359 at 
1360 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam; the panel members were Goodwin, J., Schroeder, J., 
and Poole, J.), petition for cert. filed April 1, 1987, injunction stayed, 107 S.Ct. 1515 
(1987) (O'Connor, J., in chambers). 
121. [d. 
122.Id. 
123. [d. at 1362. Western was scheduled to go out of existence in 12 hours. Id. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. at 1360. 
126. [d. at 1362. The court said the cited cases generally involved an attempt by a 
union after a merger has taken effect to force a successor employer to be bound by a 
labor contract entered into by the union and the predecessor employer. [d. 
127. 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981). Panoramic Corporation announced a sale of a 
portion of its business. [d. at 278. The labor contract between the parties in Panoramic 
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Seventh Circuit had affirmed an order under the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA)129 enjoining the sale of corporate assets 
until the completion of arbitration over the selling corporation's 
failure to bind the successor corporation to its labor contracts.l30 
In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit accordingly, re-
versed and remanded.l3l The court, however, provided an alter-
native to Western: if Delta and Western stipulated that the re-
sult of the arbitration would bind the surviving corporation, the 
injunction would terminate and the constituent corporations 
could complete the scheduled merger.132 
VI. APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 
Justice O'Connor first noted that a Circuit Justice may va-
cate a stay where the rights of a party may be seriously and ir-
reparably injured and when he or she is of the opinion that the 
contained a provision which purported to bind "successors" to the agreement. Id. The 
union moved to enjoin the sale of assets pending an arbitration to determine the applica-
bility of the labor contract provision. Id. at 279. The district court granted the motion 
and Panoramic appealed. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court injunction, 
but only after a careful balancing of the equities. Id. at 288. The court cautioned against 
the use of the injunction to compel arbitration since the risk was particularly great in 
situations involving contracts that contain a "management prerogatives" clause that 
could cause encroachment on management powers. Id. at 284. The court urged a search-
ing analysis of the facts and law in carefully applying the balancing of hardships prereq-
uisite. Id. at 289. 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that courts are without jurisdiction to grant in-
junctive relief in a labor dispute unless a hearing is conducted and specific findings of 
fact are made by the court. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). The findings require an unlawful act, 
irreparable injury, no adequate remedy at law, an inability of public officers to protect 
property, and that as to each item of relief granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon 
complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting 
of relief. Id. In Panoramic, the injunction could result in the loss of the sale of a profita-
ble department of the company, but the court found, on balance, that the loss of one 
hundred and thirteen jobs required the court's protection. Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 278. 
128. Western, 813 F.2d at 1363. See Chicago & North Western Ry. v. United Trans-
portation Union, 402 U.S. 570 at 579 n.11 (1971) where the U.S. Supreme Court issued 
the caveat that parallels between the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act should be drawn 
with the utmost care and with full awareness of the differences between the statutory 
schemes. 
129. The National Labor Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1982). 
130. Western, 813 F.2d at 1363. 
131. Id. at 1364. 
132. Id. 
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appeals court was demonstrably wrong in its application of ac-
cepted standards for issuing a stay.133 She then stayed the in-
junction stating that the balancing of equities weighed against 
the injunction, and that the ruling was directly contrary to other 
circuits.134 
Justice O'Connor noted that prior rulings in the First, Sec-
ond, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and D.C. Circuits cast grave doubts 
on the validity of the Ninth Circuit's action.13G She further 
stated that four Justices would vote for Certiorari and there-
upon ruled for Western.13S 
Justice O'Connor analyzed the "alternatives" offered to 
Western and Delta by the Ninth Circuit for lifting of the injunc-
tion.13? The first alternative, or the basic decision of the Ninth 
Circuit, prohibited the merger until the completion of the arbi-
tration process.13S If the arbitrator's decision was adverse to the 
company or contrary to decisional rules, the company would 
have had full judicial review available to it on jurisdictional as 
well as other issues.139 The parties would then be in the same 
position before and after the arbitrator's decision, except the 
dispute would be over the court's jurisdiction to enforce an arbi-
trator's decision after the hearing, as opposed to the pre-hearing 
issue of the company's obligation even to submit the issue to an 
arbitrator.14o In reality, the Ninth Circuit was not making a deci-
sion at all but merely postponing final resolution.141 
The second alternative required that Western, literally mo-
ments before the effective time of the merger, concede to the 
union's position to abide by an arbitrator's decision in order to 
effectuate the merger.142 Justice O'Connor considered the condi-
tions and alternatives put to Western and Delta as unnecessary 
133. Western Air Lines, Inc., v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 107 S.Ct. 
1515, 1517 (1987) (decision on application for stay) (O'Connor, J., in chambers). 
134. [d. at 1517. 
135. [d. at 1518. 
136. [d. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. 
141. [d. 
142. [d. 
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or inequitable.143 
Justice O'Connor reviewed and balanced the equities in-
volved.144 The merger included the transfer, modification and 
cancellation of hundreds of Western's contracts; approval by the 
Federal Aviation Administration of Western's operating certifi-
cates;145 maintenance and flight schedule changes; transfer of 
Western's international routes to Delta; and changes in wages, 
hours and working conditions of employees.146 She stated that to 
assume that enjoining the merger would do no more than pre-
serve the "status quo" would be to "blink at reality."147 
Justice O'Connor then contrasted the resulting injury to 
Western employees.148 She noted that employees were protected 
by the typical labor protective devices obtained in previous air-
line mergers.149 Justice O'Connor held for Western because the 
balance tipped in its favor and stayed the injunction.150 
VII. CRITIQUE 
Delta simply did not want to adopt the labor contract that 
the Teamsters' had with Western. Voluntary adoption of a labor 
contract by a successor is not uncommon, however. The Fifth 
Circuit noted in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
Texas International,!51 that so long as the operating unit was 
not dramatically altered by a merger that clearly erased the 
union's majority, the employer must adhere to its labor 
contracts.152 
143. Id. at 1519. 
144. Id. at 1518. Balancing of the equities did not expressly appear in the written 
Ninth Circuit opinion. 
145. Id. The lack of FAA approval cast doubts upon Western's ability to operate 
independently after April 1. Id. 
146.Id. 
147. Id. at 1519. 
148.Id. 
149. Id. The devices included continuation of certain fringe benefits, displacement 
and dismissal allowances for several years, moving and related costs, and integration of 
seniority lists. 
150.Id. 
151. 717 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1983). 
152. Id. at 164. 
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For a brief period between December 1986 until April, 1987, 
Western remained a wholly owned subsidiary of Delta with sepa-
rate operations. The operating unit was not dramatically altered 
by the merger.lllS No Delta employees were combined with West-
ern employees. There was no representation dispute since the 
same union represented the same employees working for the 
same corporation.11l4 Western adhered to the labor contracts. 
The dispute would emerge only when the work forces were com .. > 
bined in an operational merger. 
Circumstances other than separate operations can lead to 
voluntary adoption of a labor agreement. For example, voluntary 
adoption occurred in the TXI-Continental Airlines merger.lllll At 
TXI and Continental the same unions represented the pilots, 
dispatchers and mechanics.11l6 Where both constituent corpora-
tions have "crafts or classes" of employees represented by the 
same union, there is no issue as to the proper employee repre-
sentative since the same union continued to represent both 
groups after operational merger. 
Voluntary adoption of a labor agreement occurred in the 
Hughes-Airwest and Republic Airlines merger.11l7 The surviving 
corporation, Republic, adopted the labor contracts of the unions 
that represented employees at Republic.llls 
153. IBTCWHA, Local Union No. 2707 v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1359 at 
1361 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam; the panel members were Goodwin, J., Schroeder, J., 
and Poole, J.), petition for cert. filed April 1, 1987, injunction stayed, 107 S.Ct. 1515 
(1987) (O'Connor, J., in chambers). The merger agreement was signed September 9, 1986 
and Western's stock was acquired on December 16, 1986 with operational merger to take 
place on April 1. 107 S.Ct at 1516. 
154. Brief for Defendants/Appellees at 3, IBTCWHA, Local Union No. 2707 v. 
Western Air Lines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1987)(per curiam; the panel members 
were Goodwin, J., Schroeder, J., and Poole, J.), petition for cert. filed April 1, 1987, 
injunction stayed, 107 S.Ct. 1515 (1987) (O'Connor, J., in chambers). This was the struc-
ture prior to the operational merger scheduled for April 1, 1987. 
155. Texas [nt'l, 717 F.2d 157 at 160. The surviving corporation in the TXI-Conti-
nental merger recognized collective bargaining agreements with those other employee 
groups working in the merged operation that had previously been separately represented 
by the same unions; these unions represent pilots, dispatchers and mechanics. [d. Flight 
attendants had been represented by different unions, and the company notified these 
two unions that it would honor the terms of both agreements. [d. 
156. [d. 
157. Association of Flight Attendants v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 783 (D. 
Minn. 1982). See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
158. [d. 
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However, in Western, where the non-union acquiring corpo-
ration had the majority of employees in the "craft or class," 
there' is an issue of representation. Representation by a union 
selected by a minority of employees is counter to the policy that 
union representation is decided by the majority of employees.11l9 
Western refused to voluntarily recognize the labor contract 
or concede to the union's position and, based on prior case 
law,160 intended to maintain that position all the way up to 
March 31-the day before the scheduled operational merger. 
The Ninth Circuit decision crashed head on with the company's 
expectations. 
The practical effect of the ruling by the Ninth Circuit was 
to put tremendous, sudden, and unexpected pressure on Delta 
and Western to bind themselves to an arbitrator's post-merger 
decision if they wished to complete the scheduled merger. The 
risks to Western and Delta were that the decision of the arbitra-
tor could include: (1) an order for Delta to recognize the union, 
(2) an order for Delta to adopt the labor contract from Western, 
(3) an order for Western to bargain with the union over post-
merger protective devices, (4) an order for Delta to accept the 
post-merger protective devices negotiated by Western, or (5) a 
decision prohibiting the merger without the union's consent. 
The Ninth Circuit gave to the Teamsters a possible result 
that all the circuits that had dealt with cases on similar facts 
had refused to give. 
In the context of business combinations, a purchasing entity 
under the National Labor Relations Act is not obligated to ac-
cept a predecessor's employees, labor contracts or unions except 
under narrowly defined circumstances.161 The policy is based on 
159. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1934). See supra note 33. 
160. Summit Airlines, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 295, 628 F.2d 787 (2nd Cir. 
1980). The court stated: "The scheme of the Act contemplates carrier-wide organization, 
see section 2, Fourth, and the NMB usually has required organization to be carrier-
wide .... Moreover, the NMB deems the dispute requirement of section 2, Ninth, sat-
isfied even though only one union seeks representation if some employees are indifferent 
or hostile to being represented by that union or by any other union." [d. at 793 n.3. 
161. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, motion to recall judgment 
denied, 409 U.S. 818 (1972). The Supreme Court held that a successor employer may set 
the initial terms of employment. [d. at 295. A successor is not required to adopt the 
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the theory that troubled businesses, by selling, have the oppor-
tunity to start fresh and unencumbered by the burden of an ex-
pensive labor contract.IS2 
The Panoramic decision in which the Seventh Circuit en-
joined a sale under the NLRA was an exception. In that case, 
the predecessor employer had agreed that the labor contract 
would be part of the corporate sale.IS3 
The Ninth Circuit relied on this exception as precedent for 
the ruling in Western. Western and the Teamsters had freely 
agreed, in the face of economic pressures, to protect the corpora-
tion from financial distress through wage reductions.l64 In re-
turn, Western had agreed that in the event of a sale or merger 
the labor contract would be binding on the surviving corpora-
tion.165 Western unilaterally abrogated that agreement by not 
eliciting Delta's agreements to the labor contracts.166 This abro-
gation of its agreement and the refusal to arbitrate was what the 
Ninth Circuit ruled was unfair and illegal.16? 
However, other courts of appeals instruct us that in the face 
of corporate combinations, agreements with labor unions can be 
abrogated.16B This is the practical effect of Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor's stay of the injunction. 
In truth, the Teamsters' labor contract with Western may 
labor contract of the predecessor employer. Id. at 281-82. A successor is not required to 
bargain with the predecessor's union unless the successor hires a majority of the prede-
cessor's employees in the same collective bargaining unit. Id. at 277,279. The holding in 
Burns seems to have some interesting practical twists. If the labor market is tight or the 
work requires a particular skill or qualification, the successor will have to hire the prede-
cessor's employees purely for market reasons. However, if the labor contract has artifi-
cally pushed the costs of labor beyond market levels, the successor will be able to hire 
new employees from other sources at terms of employment that it sets unilaterally. 
162. Burns, 406 U.S. 272. Burns emphasized that U[A] potential employer may be 
willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make changes in corporate struc-
ture, composition of the labor force •.• and nature of supervision." Id. at 287-88. 
163. See supra note 123, and accompanying text. 
164. Western, 813 F.2d at 1361. See infra note 13. 
165. Western, 813 F.2d at 1361. 
166.Id. 
167. Id. at 1364. 
168. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 325 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1963). See 
supra note 62; lAM v. Northeast, 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1972). See supra note 70; lAM v. 
Northeast 11,536 F.2d 975 (1st Cir. 1976). See supra note 84; Texas Int'l, 717 F.2d 157 
(5th Cir. 1983). See supra note 91; Republic, 798 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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be unnecessary to protect employee interests. The employees 
were protected by the labor protective devices advocated by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board.169 The working conditions and benefits 
at Delta were as good as, and wages were generally better, than 
at Western.170 The Western employees merely lost union repre-
sentation. But union representation had not afforded them bet-
ter wages, hours and working conditions than what was available 
at non-union Delta. It appears that the Ninth Circuit injunction 
resulted in a situation where everyone, Western, Delta, the em-
ployees, and possibly the shareholders came up losers. Only the 
union's continued existence would qualify the union as coming 
up a winner. 
The balance of equities analysis by Justice O'Connor seems 
to concur with this analysis.17l Her opinion lacks any mention of 
the union's financial loss of dues paying members or recognition 
that airline mergers have resulted in the erosion of the union's 
member base, its income and its effectiveness. Against the mo-
mentum of judicial opinion, the union in Western was fighting 
for its life. The Ninth Circuit tried to give them a last breath of 
hope, but failed. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The present case suggests it may be correct policy to permit 
abrogation of labor contracts when a merger occurs. Corporate 
efficiency, freedom from unreasonable restraints on alienation, 
and government mandated protection of employees seem to far 
outweigh any social value found in the preservation of a union's 
status, financial base, and income. It is true by definition that an 
efficient capitalistic system requires corporations be freely trans-
ferrable. The result, however, is that the labor contract provi-
sions, negotiated in good faith, that provide employee protec-
tions in the event of a merger, become worthless when they may 
be most needed. Bankruptcy,172and now merger, are the death 
169. Western II, 107 S.Ct. at 1518. 
170. See supra note 13. 
171. Western II, 107 S.Ct. at 1518. 
172. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that the employer, after declaring bankruptcy, may immediately abrogate its labor 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss1/11
1988] LABOR LAW 219 
knell of the labor contract. The result of this case is the most 
recent manifestation of a clear policy trend. 
Melvin P. Anderson* 
contract. See also, Comment, supra note 6, at 1015-20. The author suggests that 
Bildisco, a National Labor Relations Act case, has impact under the RLA in the event of 
bankruptcy, allowing the abrogation of a labor contract in the event of bankruptcy. [d. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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